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The catastrophic events of these last years such as the catastrophe of AZF in 2001 orthe various terrorist
attacks lead to an evolution of the concept of risk by integrating dimensions of crisis and threat. The
damages which result from this are not present on a delimited area but impact the whole society.
The crisis organizations are destabilized by the unusual features of these situations. The managers
must anticipate these situations as soon as possible; react efficiently and in a fast way in order to
avoid the consequences of the crisis. However, the decision makers need a fast, clear and structured
expertise allowing a reduction of uncertainties related to the crisis and to increase the knowledge
about the situation. The objective of this paper is to present, after a state of the art on the crises, a meth-
odology of decision-making aid to help the competent authorities through the assessment of a potential
of crisis usable in vigilance and during the emergency phase.
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INTRODUCTION
The major risks which are caused by man made events or
natural events, are always inherent in our modern's societies
but their apprehensions have changed at the beginning of the
eighties with the first researches on the subject. The cata-
strophic events of the last years such as the industrial disasters
in 2001 in France or the various terrorist's attacks have brought
about some changes in the concept of risk by integrating
dimensions of crisis and threat in a more important way.
Nowadays, the European and French policies point out the
necessity of the improvement of crisis management in the
aim to deal correctly with these news and delicates situations
and to protect the populations. The objectives of this study is
to propose the development of an expertise usable in a continu-
ous way, to anticipate on a trigger event while detecting the
warning signals but also to avoid a crisis of great scale by
taking into account the aggravating factors. This methodology
of decision making aid will help the decision-makers to antici-
pate a crisis but also to manage a crisis of great scale by the
assessment of a crisis potential index.
The paper is organized as follow. The first part,
through a state of the art, puts forward the characteristics
of a crisis in the aim to increase the knowledge about this
particular situation. Then, the paper presents the different
means to learn about a crisis and a case study to illustrate
this purpose and the last part will strive to provide the
principal phases of the methodology of decision-making aid.
CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS
As for the risk, the notion of crisis is a concept due to the
fact that each actor taking part in the crisis management
has a different vision according to their perception and
their domain of competencies. Indeed, a same situation
can be perceived as a crisis for some of them but also,
as a simple emergency situation for others. Several defi-
nitions of the crisis exist and this notion is used and
abused (Shrivastava, 1993) in several domains. Some
characteristics reported in the literature allowing to
defined a crisis as a situation due to a sudden, surprising
and unexpected event (Boon, 2006), called also triggering
event that the probability of occurrence is low (Mitroff,
1988) and that causes severe consequences on human,
environment, properties, large economics and socials cost
(Shrivastava, 1993). But the main characteristic of a
crisis lies in the impact on an organization which presents
some difficulties to manage them. Indeed, the decision-
makers must face to negatives effects as the stress, the
lack of information, several uncertainties and a great com-
plexity in the roots causes, in the consequences and in the
dynamic of the extreme situation.
A crisis can be understood as a process (Roux Dufort,
2005) that takes place in space and time. In this study, two
types of crisis can be defined as an abrupt crisis (1) versus
a cumulative crisis (2) in comparison with an accidental
situation (3) (Figure 1).
1. The abrupt crisis results from a trigger event, of which
the kinetic is instantaneous and of which the hazard
potential is high, causing a crisis that develops under
the actions of aggravating factors.
2. A contrario, in the case of a cumulative crisis, the situ-
ation appeared in a gradual way (during several days or
months), after a trigger event, under also the action of
aggravating factors.
3. In the case of accidental situation, an immediate
response takes place. The management of the situation
is without main difficulties. This type corresponds to a
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Figure 1. Conceptualization of dynamics process of major accidents and major crises
Various numbers of stages can be defined allowing
understanding the crisis process
• The warning signal or incubation period (Turner,
1978): This period corresponds to an accumulation of
little events or incidents that can be advertised if the
organization is able to detect the warning signals.
They correspond to indications that can inform about
the occurrence of a trigger event or a crisis. Two type
of signals are defined as the weak signal (information
imprecise and early that the quantity is poor but that
the time of anticipation is greater) and the high signal
(quantity of information is important but the time of
anticipation is reduced). Generally, various means of
detection or alert are set up to inform the population
but also the employees of industrial plants of the
occurrence of a trigger event. But several crises can
be preceded of warning signals but it is noted; after
an analysis of lessons learnt from past, that some
signals have not been detected or no take into
account in time.
• The trigger event: The nature, the intensity but also the
numbers of event can initiate an abrupt crisis or a cumu-
lative crisis. As soon as possible, different emergency
plans are prompted. A command chain and a crisis organ-
ization are set up in order to deal with the situation and to
limit the consequences. An emergency phase takes place
(Cf. Figure 1).
• But, under the action of aggravating factors, the acci-
dental situation can amplify in different steps of time
either in abrupt manner (1) or in a slower way (2).
They correspond to parameters that amplify (Gatot,
2000) an initial situation to lead to a crisis. They can
be many origins as, for example, technological (collapse
of communication), organizational origin (lack of
coordination). These parameters contribute to create a
complex situation and to affect the decision aid
process. The decision-makers have to implement
news actions and news plans according to these news
parameters in order to quickly get out of the crisis.
• Other important phase corresponds to the resolution
and the end of management. During this transition
phase before the return to a normal situation, decision
makers should maintain their vigilance and even
should strive harder than ever in order to avoid the
occurrence of news events inducing a new crisis
situation (Lagadec, 1991).
For this reason, this study aims to develop a
decision-aid process in order to improve the crisis man-
agement but also to reduce the impact of the situation
on the decision process. The increase of performance
must be based on the lessons learnt because that allows
to determine and integrate the warning signals, the aggra-
vating factors but also all the negatives and positives
parameters that contribute to create a crisis.
HOW LEARNING? LESSONS LEARNT,
EXERCISES AND SIMULATIONS
The risk management and particularly the industrial risk
assessment can be based on the lessons learnt after an
event but this practice is not systematic for natural hazards
(Ayral, 2004).
The lessons learnt after an accident or a crisis take
place in different step of time.
• Immediately after the end of the event, generally one
week, a first study is conduced in order to collect the
first impressions, positives or negatives, of the actors
but also to list damages or indirect consequences
(Ayral, 2004). This step can be named the immediate
lessons learnt or lessons learnt on the spot.
• The second step of learning takes place several months
later. These studies are more complete and have for
objectives to analyse the roots causes of the accidents,
to describe all the consequences, to try to find the aggra-
vating factors and the warning signals, to highlight the
failures, in the aim to improve, in the future, the antici-
pation and the detection of a crisis, but also to put the
organizational failures, in an obvious, without trying to
seek responsible.
Beyond the operational aspects that are generated by a
crisis, the lessons leant is essential in order to put forward
the factors which led to this situation. Indeed, lessons
learnt allows to highlight the positive and negative aspects
in order to capitalize the knowledge acquired during the
crisis, thus to prevent the occurrence of a forthcoming
crisis, to improve the vigilance by detecting warning
signals (Wybo, 2004) and trigger event of a crisis but also
the aggravating factors.
The learning can be made also through exercises or
simulations of accidental scenarios allowing to improve
the coordination between the varied actors via an increase
of knowledge of "With which I must work? How must I
work?", to test the operational techniques, the emergency
plans and to prevent in fine individual error (Crichton,
2001).
So that the learning about crisis was efficiently, the
exercises and the lessons learnt must integrated the
various characteristics of the crisis that is a description of
the accident and the consequences but also the weak
signals and aggravating factors in the aim of not starting
again the last errors and to capitalize the knowledge as in
the following example.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES STUDIES
The 21 s t September, at 10h17, a terrible explosion occurred
in Toulouse generating the greater catastrophe in France of
the last years.
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION
The explosion took place in a warehouse used for a tempor-
ary storage of "off-specifications" ammonium nitrate. The
mass of the substance was estimated by INERIS (Dechy,
2004, a) in a range of 20 -40 t of TNT that is the equivalence
of 20-120t of Ammonium nitrate involved as reactant. The
roots causes of the explosion haven't found an agreement
among investigators and a controversy about the ignition
source of the ammonium nitrate stored.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS
The extent of the damages following this terrible explosion
is impressive principally on the population of Toulouse and
on the buildings.
Human effects
According to the different report (INVS, 2006; Dechy,
2004,a; INESC, 2002), the first conclusions have identified
as 30 fatalities which 21 on the site and 9 off-site, about
9 000 peoples injured with hospitalization (about 860) or
medical care The sanitary consequences, in long term, on
the population were principally due to three effects:
toxicological - transient eyes effects and respiratory
effects for the people leaving nearby-, traumatic - blast
effects due to the overpressure causing three types of
lesion as body wounds (418 persons), eyes injuries and ear
traumatism (522 persons) - and physiologic - post-trau-
matic stress (5 600 persons), psychotropic treatment,
depression - (INVS, 2006).
Material effects
The extent of the materials damages in the city of Toulouse
was very important and was estimated of 1 500 million
Euros by (Dechy, 2004, b) with 75 000 notifications of dis-
aster including about 30 000 housings and 12 000 families
have to be rehoused, several schools and universities were
damaged and required to be built again and about 1 300
companies were damaged causing about 7000 persons
unemployment.
THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: EXAMPLES
OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS
FOR THE ACTORS
During the first days of the crisis, about 1500 persons were
mobilized to manage this extreme situation.
Several problems have emerged and have contri-
buted to lead to a complex situation. In the aim to under-
stand recurring problems in crisis management, some
examples of difficulties encountered by firemen, Mobile
Emergency Medical Service, policemen, are exposed
(INESC, 2002).
• Problem for the location of the accident area due to a
large scale of shock wave impacts and the several calls
for terrorist attacks in the centre of the city. Indeed,
the explosion has occurred one week after the World
Trate Center generating a climate of worries.
• Collapse of the entire communication network during 10
minutes for the emergency call and during 8 hours for
the rest of the city cutting of Toulouse from the France.
• No adequate protection for the first firemen and no gaz
detector for toxic cloud
• Overloading of the radio networks leading to difficulties
for emergencies services to communicate, to transfer
information's. This is created a slowdown and a no-
coordination of the organization on site. The overload-
ing of the communications ways has also aggravated
the management of the accident.
• Imbalance between the means and the needs requiring
emergencies reinforcements that are arrived 12 hours
after.
• Definition in emergency of a new strategy of injuries
management to deal with the extent of the accident.
What lessons can be learnt about this dramatic acci-
dent? This extent of this event has demonstrated a limited
response capacity of the first aids (or rescuers) and has high-
lighted several gaps as a lack of preparation for crisis man-
agement when the risk is unknown, a lack of information
about the nature of the explosion, difficulties to identify
an unknown risk, difficulties to manage the flows of circula-
tion, problem of transmission of information, the lack of
emergency-plan for the policeman and some difficulties in
hospital for managing a massive surge of victims.
Several lessons and news regulatory plans were created
after this greater catastrophe as:
• Reinforcement of emergency response and planning
• Reinforcement of risk assessment
• News regulation in European Union and in France
This case allows defining several aggravating factors
can be proposed as for the communications: the default in
alert, the collapse or rupture of networks, the lack of com-
munication being able to create a lack of coordination
between actors. This dramatic event allows to define and
to target the essentials information's useful for the antici-
pation of various problems that an organization could face
during a crisis.
The lessons learnt after an accident are essential in
order to highlight the negatives and positives causes and
consequences of the crises but also to seek the warning
signals and the aggravating factors in the aim to
improve the management thought a decision-making aid
process.
A SOLUTION TO ANTICIPATE AND MITIGATE
A CRISIS: THE DEFINITION OF A
DECISION-MAKING AID PROCESS
OBJECTIVES
The aim of this study is to propose a framework allowing to
the crisis manager, within the case of industrial, natural or
intentional crisis, to collect and analyse the information's
that coming from their environment, in a continuous way,
24 h/24 h. This methodology will allow an anticipation of
changes caused by an event that potentially can produce a
crisis while reducing their vulnerability and the uncertainty
of the situation.
The general objective of this study is double:
• To anticipate, in vigilance, a trigger event that can
induce a crisis of great scale.
• To mitigate an important crisis during the emergency
phase by detecting the aggravating factors that can
amplify the initial situation.
To be done, several indicators will be defined in the
aim to establish a level of crisis allowing informing in a
clear way, the manager.
This methodology allowing establishing a potential of
crisis, is composed of two stages (Figure 2):
Stage 1: The characterization of the crisis system.
Stage 2: The definition of indicators and the definition of the
potential of crisis. This stage corresponds to the organiz-
ation of the information, to the definition of the indicators
used to assess the potential of crisis.
THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
CRISIS SYSTEM
The first step of the methodology corresponds to the targeting
of the information's characterizing a crisis. For this, a sys-
temic approach is used to structure the problem. A crisis
can be defined as a trigger event that impacts the stakes
(the humans and their activities, the natural and built environ-
ment), the actors who set up various actions, the whole in a
political and international context favourable for a crisis.
Several resources (cases study, lessons learnt) are used to
create different typologies (trigger events, stakes and the
potential consequences, actors, weak signals and aggravating
factors) that constituting the input data. These different
Lessons
learnt
Stage 1 : Characterization of the crisis system
Bibliography Case study Crisis
experts
DailyI
* Typology of trigger events
* Typology of stakes and consequences
* Typology of actors and their actions
* Typology of warning signals
* Typology of aggravating factors




Stage 2 : The definition of indicators and crisis potential
1. Identification of criteria and elements qualifying each indicators
2. Construction of hierarchical structures
3. Contruction of function describing each hierarchical structure
4. Collect of experts judgments




Figure 2. The definition of the decision making process
typologies allowed defining each indicator and finally the
potential of crisis.
THE DEFINITION OF INDICATORS AND CRISIS
POTENTIAL
The objective of the methodology is thus of to create a
potential of crisis based on the aggregation of indicators.
For these, the use of a multi-criteria decision method
proves to be adequate.
Indeed, the decision making process in crisis manage-
ment is qualified as complex because several elements of
description and analyses of the process of crisis intervene in
an interactive and interdependent way. So, to take the right
decision in the right time, it's necessary to organize the infor-
mation' s. For this, a multi-criteria hierarchical method (Saaty,
1984) is used because it brings an organization of information
and appreciations which intervene in the process of decision-
making (Tixier, 2006). Five main steps are defined:
Step 1: Identification of criteria and elements qualifying
each indicator based on the characterisation of system
defined previously.
As underline previously, a crisis can be understood
through a systemic approach allowing defining several sub
system as the context, the trigger event, the crisis actors
and their actions, the consequences on the various stakes,
the weak signals and the aggravating factors. Each sub
system corresponds to a general indicator. Thus for each
indicator is defined according to several criterions and
elements. The objective being of to anticipate a crisis
through vigilance, the indicator weak signal could be
characterised, for example, by criterion that put in exergue
an increase of activities in different emergency services by
the use the criterion "call" and "activities" for a specific
event compared to a normal. The normal will be defined
regardless to the activity of the precedents months or years.
After the collect of information allowing the qualifi-
cation of each indicator, the following step corresponds to
the organization of this information.
Step 2: Construction of hierarchical structures
In order to answer to the potential of crisis proble-
matic, the indicators, the criterions and the elements must
be organized. Therefore the step two consists to establish
several hierarchical structures.
The construction of a hierarchical structure requires
the creation or the identification of links between the
various levels of this structure (Tixier, 2006). Four levels
are defined. The upper level corresponds to the global objec-
tive i.e the assessment of the crisis potential (Figure 3).
Therefore, the quantification of each indicator (Level 2) is
assessed by a set of criterions (level 3) and elements (level
4). But other hierarchical structures take place at all the
levels. These structures allow then to compare the import-
ance of each criterion with another one is evaluated by the
way of binary comparison.
Step 3: Construction of function describing each
hierarchical structures
From each hierarchical structure, the functions are
deduced. For example, the function for the crisis potential
could be defined in the following way (Eq. 1):
Potential of Crisis = a • IContexte þ b • ITE þ g •
+ d • ICq þ eIWS þ ZIAF (1)
With TE, trigger event; CQ, consequences; WS, weak
signals; AF, aggravating factors. The weight of each indi-
cator will be assessing by expert judgement.
The indicator "weak signal" being composed of two
criterions "Call" and "Activities", the function could be
defined (Eq. 2 and Eq. 3) as:
I Call = a I call (F) þ b I call (MEMS)
+ g I call (Hl) þ d I call ( . . . ) (2)
I Activities = a I action (Firemen) þ b I act (MEMS)
+ g I act (H) þ d I act ( . . . ) (3)
Potential of crisis
Context Trigger E Stakes Management Level 2
Weak signal Aggravating factors
Figure 3. The global hierarchical structure of the potential of crisis
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With F, Firemen; MEMS, Mobile Emergency
Medical Service; H, Hospital,
Step 4: The collect of expert's judgments
This step corresponds to the assessment of the priority
between each criterion based on pairwise comparisons of
elements. The experts assess the relative importance of an
element compared to other of the same hierarchical structure
through a numerical scale (Saaty, 1987). The expert judge-
ment is collected through the use of questionnaires. At the
end of this step, each indicator, criterion and element will
be modified by a weigh (corresponding, in this example,
to a, b, g, d, e, and z).
Step 5: Validation of coherence
To validate the coherence of expert judgement, a ratio
of coherence for each hierarchical structure will be
calculated.
But several limits emerge and will take into account.
By definition, a crisis is an only situation. The lack of infor-
mation but also the abundance of information can be also a
revealing indicator of crisis. Some elements present during a
crisis can have any effect whereas in other situation, they
can have an aggravating effect and amplify the initial
situation.
CONCLUSION
The crisis management is one of the political issues of the
European and French governments. Indeed, each year, a
crisis of great scale impacts societies causing more and
more dramatics damages on the population but also on the
economy of a country. The crises correspond to dynamics
phenomenon's which can be defined by an event approach
(trigger event is the starting point of the crisis in the case
of abrupt crises) or by a process approach (the crisis has
started before and under the impact of a trigger event,
increases in intensity). The improvement of the crisis man-
agement can be process by several ways as:
• An increase of the knowledge about these extremes situ-
ations through the formalisation of lessons learnt from
the past and by the use of simulation in the aim to
improve the coordination between actors
• The definition of an expertise usable in a continuous
way, to anticipate a trigger event while detecting the
warning signals but also to avoid a crisis of great scale
by taking account the aggravating factors via the cre-
ation of a crisis potential index. A crisis represents an
opportunity to learn.
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